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CENTRAL ACTS EXTENDED BY J&K Reorganisation Act 2019

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Shri M.K. Sharma

Principal Secretary to Hon’ble the Chief Justice holds the additional charge of Director, J&k Judicial Academy )- Principal Secretary is a District and Sessions rank Judicial Officer. He attends matters pertaining to employees of Subordinate Judiciary such as transfers, promotions, leave etc. Also is ex-officio Secretary of Public Interest Litigation Cell. He also attends all other matters assigned by the Lord Chief Justice.

Shri Tasleem Arief

Registrar Vigilance is a District and Sessions Judge rank Judicial Officer. He deals with all the complaints received in the High Court against the High Court Staff as well as District Judiciary. He also deals with statistics section of the registry.

Shri Anoop Kumar Sharma

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Ms. Sandeep Kour

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Shri Farooq Ahmad Bhat

Registrar Judicial is a District and Sessions Judge rank Judicial Officer who looks after day to day administration of their wings besides listing of cases before the Court. They also exercise powers on the Judicial side as provided under the High Court Rules.

Registrars Adminstration (Sh. Mohammad Yasin Beigh (Main-Wing) )- There are three post of Registrars Adminstration , one at Jammu, one at Srinagar Wing and Main Wing of the High Court.

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Central Project Coordinator e-Courts - The Central Project Coordinator e-Courts (CPC e-Courts) is an Officer of the rank of District Judge or Senior Civil Judge, who would co-ordinate the implementation of various modules/ tasks of the e-Courts Project, for which he would liaison with the e-Committee, Supreme Court of India. This assignment is presently look after by Mr. Anoop Kumar Sharma Registrar Computers(I.T)

Director Finance (Sh. Haroon Ahmad Bhat) on deputation at High Court of J&K and Ladakh

Hon'ble Ms. Justice Moksha Khajuria Kazmi

Justice Moksha Khajuria Kazmi, passed out LL.B from Jammu University in the year 1996 and started practicing in the J&K High Court at Jammu. She was awarded the ‘Best Advocate of the year’ Award in 1998 by Kashmir Law General. She moved to practice in the J&K High Court at Srinagar in 1999 and was the standing counsel for various organizations like Medical Council of India, J&K Sports Council, J&K Power Development Department, ASCOMS, J&K State Legal Services Authority, J&K State Forest Corporation Ltd., Jet Airways Ltd., Board of Professional Entrance Examination (BOPE), Metlife India Insurance Company Limited, Islamic University of Science and Technology, etc.
She served as Asst Advocate General from 2002 to 2004 and as Addl Advocate General from 2016 to 2017.
She was in the Board of Directors of J&K State Financial Corporation and Baramulla Cooperative Bank.
She was designated as Senior Advocate on 3rd of December, 2020.
She was appointed as Additional Judge of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, vide Notification No.K-13021/01/2019-US.II dated 24th March 2022 and took oath of office on 28th of March, 2022.

Hon'ble Shri Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal

Mr. Nargal hails from Katra, Jammu & Kashmir and did his initial schooling from Dewan Badri Nath Vidya Mandir, Jammu. He pursued graduation from GGM Science College, Jammu and LLB from the University of Jammu, following which he independently started his active practice from March 1991. He was designated as a Senior Advocate by J&K High Court on 03.12.2020 and has formerly served as Senior Additional Advocate General of the J&K Home Department. He holds the distinction of serving as the Standing Counsel for various departments of Government of India as well as the J&K Government, Public Sector Undertakings, Banks, Universities in addition to his own private practice, spanning over an illustrious legal practice of 31 years. He has served as the Standing Counsel for University of Jammu, SKAUST-J, Baba Ghulam Shah University, Rajouri, Cluster University, Jammu. Furthermore, he has remained as a Senior Counsel for Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Union Public Service Commission, Food Corporation of India, J&K Public Service Commission, Service Selection Board, Sales Tax & Exercise Department, JK IMPA, General Administration Department and State Pollution Control Board. Mr. Nargal has also served as Central Government Counsel, Counsel for J&K Education Department on terms and conditions as Additional Advocate General. He holds expertise in taxation, service, academic, arbitration and civil matters and other writ jurisdiction. He was recommended for elevation as a Judge of the High Court by J&K High Court Collegium and appointed as Additional Judge of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, vide Notification No.K-13021/02/2017-US.II dated 1st June 2022 and took oath of office on 3rd of June, 2022.

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Judgement Headlines

Crl R No. 16/2019
Raaisha (minor) through her mother Sumaira v. Syed Sudhanshu Panday
Decided on: January 27, 2022

Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh cautioned the Magistrates dealing with a petition under Section 125 of Cr.P.C where the paternity of a child is seriously disputed and there is no prima facie material to suggest that the respondent happens to be the father of the child to first as certain the veracity of claim of the petitioner before fastening the respondent with the liability of maintaining the child. Hon’ble Court was considering a revision petition preferred against the order passed by the 2nd Additional Munsiff, Srinagar in the proceedings under Section 488 of J&K Cr.P.C whereby the learned Magistrate had deferred the proceedings till the outcome of the civil suit in which question of paternity of the petitioner was in issue. It was observed“ 18. There can be no dispute to the proposition that grant of maintenance to a minor child should be the paramount consideration for a Magistrate dealing with a petition under Section 125 of Cr.P.C, but when the paternity of a child is seriously disputed and there is no prima facie material to suggest that the respondent happens to be the father of the child, it would not be prudent for a Magistrate to fasten the respondent with the liability of maintaining the child without first ascertaining the veracity of claim of the petitioner. In the case of Ahmad Ullah’s case (supra), this Court did emphasize the need to provide immediate succor to the minor child till the question of his paternity is finally decided, but the Court, before doing so, had prima facie come to a conclusion that there was probability that petitioner and respondent’s mother in that case may have, during the course of their employment in one Hospital, cohabited with each other, even if their marriage was not proved. It is in those circumstances that this Court directed that the question of payment of maintenance in favour of minor child needs to be decided first subject to the outcome of issue regarding paternity of the minor child”.

CRM(M) No.46/2021
Parvaiz Ahmad Bhat & Anr v. Fida Mohamamd Ayoub
Decided on: December 28, 2021

Hon’ble Single Bench of High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh while deciding a petition wherein the core issue for determination was whether dishonor of a cheque for the reason that there were incomplete signatures appearing on the cheque, constitutes an offense under Section 138 of the NI Act, rejected the contention of the petitioner that that offense under Section 138 of the NI Act is not constituted because the cheques were dishonored on account of incomplete signatures and not for the reason of insufficiency of funds or exceeding the arrangement and concluded that criminal prosecution against the accused in such cases should be allowed to proceed. It was observed “it appears that it is only in two situations that Section 138 of the NI Act is attracted, firstly when there are insufficient funds available in the bank account of the person who is drawing the cheque and secondly where it exceeds the arrangement. However, the provision has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in a number of judgments in a manner so as to include within its ambit even the cases where the dishonor of cheque has taken place for the reasons other than the aforesaid two reasons”. Relying upon Laxmi Dyechem vs. State of Gujarat and others, (2012) 13 SCC 375, it was further observed.” 14) The Supreme Court on the basis of the aforesaid observations and the ratio, while dealing with a case in which the cheques were dishonoured by the bank on the ground that drawer’s signatures were incomplete and that no image was found or that the signatures did not match, came to the conclusion that criminal prosecution against the 9 CRM(M) No.46/2021 accused in such cases should be allowed to proceed and the judgment and orders passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings were set aside.”With the observation, the petition was dismissed.

CRR No.14/2015
Jyoti Bala and Others v. State of J&K
Decided on: December 20, 2021

Hon’ble Single Bench of High Court Of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, while considering a criminal revision petition also determined whether the framing of charge is an interlocutory order and, therefore, not revisable in view of the bar created by sub-section (2) of Section 435 of Cr. P. C; and the nature of the enquiry that is required to be made by the trial Court at the stage of framing of charges in a criminal case. Hon’ble Court referred to case law Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, 2021 SCC Online SC 367, Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2018) 16 SCC 299 and Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551, wherein it was held that the orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither interlocutory nor final in nature and, therefore, not affected by the bar of Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C, 1973, and observed that framing of charge is neither an interlocutory nor a final order. Since the framing of charge determines a vital right of the accused to be put or not to be put on trial, as such, the same cannot be termed as a mere interlocutory order which can attract bar created under sub-section (2) of Section 435 of Cr. P. C. It was also observed that the trial court while considering the discharge application is not to act as a mere post office. It can evaluate the evidence for a limited purpose to find out whether there are sufficient grounds to try the accused. The Court has to consider the broad probabilities, the cumulative effect of the evidence, the documents and record and other basic infirmities if any appearing in the case.”19) From the above it is evident that the trial court is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the time of framing of charge and should not act as a mere post office. The endorsement on the charge sheet presented by the police as it is without applying its mind and without recording brief reasons in support of its opinion is not countenanced by law. The material which is required to be evaluated by the Court at the time of framing charge should be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous as would render the exercise a mini-trial to find out guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required at this stage is that the Court must be satisfied that the evidence collected by the prosecution is sufficient to presume that the accused has committed an offence. Even a strong suspicion would suffice. Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is placed before the Court by the prosecution in the shape of final report in terms of Section 173 of Cr. P. C, the Court may also rely upon any other evidence or material which is of sterling quality and has a direct bearing on the charge laid before it by the prosecution. (See also Bhawna Bai Vs Ganshyam (2020) 2 SCC 217)”

CR No. 31/2008(O&M)
Meena Bhan v. Ravinder Garyali
Decided on: February 25, 2022

Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, in a civil revision filed against the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge (Matrimonial Cases) Jammu by virtue of which the learned trial court had set aside the ex parte order by virtue of which the maintenance pendent elite as well as litigation expenses were granted to the petitioner, observed that provisions of the limitation Act are applicable to the proceedings under Hindu Marriage Act, when the party resort to the provisions contained in code of civil procedure either for setting aside/recall of exparte order or for restoration of the petition dismissed for default/non prosecution. It was observed “As per section 23 of Jammu and Kashmir Hindu Marriage Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have been made applicable to the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act so far as the same are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Hindu Marriage Act. No doubt the respondent had a remedy of assailing the order before the High Court by laying an appropriate motion but nonetheless, the remedy for setting aside the ex parte order for grant of maintenance as available under the Code has not been barred by the Jammu and Kashmir Hindu Marriage Act and as such, the aggrieved party against whom ex-parte order for grant of maintenance has been made is well within his rights to resort to the 5 CR No. 31/2008 provisions contained in the Code for setting aside or recall of the ex parte order. Had it been the intention of legislature to exclude the provisions of section 151 or Order 9 Rule 13 CPC to the proceedings under Hindu Marriage Act, then the legislature would have done it expressly. Once the Code is applicable to proceedings under Hindu Marriage Act, then certainly the section 5 of limitation Act willaply when the aggrieved party resort to remedy under the Code.”

CR No. 54/2021(O&M)
NardevLal and others v. Suresh Sharma and others
Decided on: February 18, 2022

Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh while considering a civil revision petition, reiterated that while considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, the averments made in the plaint are required to be considered only and the defence of the defendants cannot be considered while adjudicating an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. The plaint can be rejected only when from the averments made in the plaint it can be gathered that either there is no cause of action or the court lacks the jurisdiction. Hon’ble Court was considering civil revision filed against the order passed by the learned Additional Special Mobile Magistrate (Civil Judge) R. S. Pura by virtue of which, the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the petitioners for rejection of the aforesaid suit, had been dismissed

CRM(M) 21/2020
Yasir Amin Khan v. Abdul Rashid Ganie
Decided on: November 22, 2021

Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh laid down extensive guidelines regarding approach of the trial Court while awarding punishment to an accused convicted for commission of offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act , in petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C wherein the petitioner sought setting aside of order passed by the Special Mobile Magistrate (Sub-Judge), Srinagar in a complaint filed under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1981 whereby on the basis of statement made by the respondent-accused under Section 242 Cr.P.C (251 Central Act), he has been convicted and punished with simple imprisonment for a term of six months and in addition and he has been held liable to pay compensation of Rs.2.00 lac to the opposite side. The petitioner was not aggrieved by the impugned order insofar as it convicts accused for commission of offence under Section 138 of N.I.Act and imposes punishment of simple imprisonment . However, his grievance was that the respondent-accused should have also been awarded fine sufficient to meet the liability of the cheque issued by him which later on was dishonoured. Hon’ble Court reiterated the Apex Court observation that unlike other forms of crime, the punishment for commission of offence under Section 138 of N. I. Act is not a means of seeking retribution but is more a means to ensure payment of money and, therefore, in respect of offence of dishonor of cheques, it is the compensatory aspect of the remedy which should be given priority over the punitive aspect.It was observed ,” 12 From a reading of provisions of Section 138 of N. I. Act in the context of laudable object sought to be achieved by Chapter XVII of N.I Act, it is abundantly clear that the Criminal Court while convicting an accused for commission of offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act, cannot ignore the compensatory aspect of remedy and the compensatory aspect can only be given due regard if the sentence imposed is at least commensurate to the amount of cheque, if not more, so that this fine, once imposed, can be appropriated towards payment of compensation to the complainant by having resort to Section 357 of Cr.P.C. Also, regarding the amount of cheque, the Hon’ble Court set out the guiding principles “20 Indisputably, the Legislature has given discretion to the Magistrate to impose a sentence of fine which may extend to double the amount of cheque and, therefore, the sentence of fine whenever imposed by the Criminal Court upon conviction of accused under Section 138 of N.I. Act must be sufficient enough to adequately compensate the complainant. The amount of cheque and the date from which the amount under the cheque has become payable along with payment of reasonable interest may serve as good guide in this regard. To be consistent and uniform, it is always advisable to impose a fine equivalent to the amount of cheque plus at least 6% interest per annum from the date of cheque till the date of judgment of conviction. However, before inflicting such fine, the trial Magistrate must eschew the amount of interim compensation, if any, paid under Section 143A of N.I. Act or such other sum which the accused might have paid during the trial or otherwise towards discharge of liability. It may or may not accompany the sentence of simple imprisonment. It is purely in the discretion of the trial Magistrate but having regard to the object of legislation, it shall be appropriate if the sentence of imprisonment imposed is kept at the minimum unless, of course, the conduct of accused demands otherwise.” With the observation, the petition was allowed and matter was remanded back to the trial Court for considering the imposition of sentence upon the respondent de novo in the light of legal position.

WP (Crl) No. 105/2021
Muntazir Ahmad Bhat v. Union Territory of JK & Anr.
Decided on: November 12, 2021

While upholding the detention of an alleged worker of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), under the J&K Public Safety Act, 1978, the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh observed that extremism, radicalism, terrorism have become the most worrying features of contemporary life. It was also observed that the basic edifices of a modern State, like democracy, State security, public order, rule of law, sovereignty and integrity, basic human rights, etcetera, are under attack of such extreme, radical, and terror acts. Hon’ble Court also noted that where individual liberty comes into conflict with an interest of the security of the State or maintenance of public order, then the liberty of the individual must give way to the larger interest of the nation. "It is, therefore, difficult in the present context to draw sharp distinctions between domestic and international terrorism. Many happenings in the recent past caused the international community to focus on the issue of terrorism with renewed intensity. Anti-fanatism, anti-extremism, antiterrorism activities in the global level are mainly carried out through bilateral and multilateral cooperation among nations. It has, in such circumstances, become our collective obligation to save and protect the State and its subjects from uncertainty, melancholy and turmoil."

OWP No.83/2019
Anjum Afshan & Ors v. State of J&K & Ors.
Decided on: November 10, 2021

In a writ petition seeking a direction upon respondents to ensure safety of their life and honour with further direction asking the official respondents to proceed against the private respondents in accordance with law. Hon’ble High Court of J&K and Ladakh observed that no law or religion gives a license to a father to harass or intimidate his major daughter just because she does not accede to his wishes to marry a particular person. Hon’ble Court noted that both the petitioners are major and that they have entered into wedlock out of their own will and volition. "No law or religion gives a license to a father to harass or intimidate his major daughter just because she does not accede to wishes of her father to marry a particular person. It is not open to a father or relatives of a girl to take law into their own hands. It is the duty of the Court to protect life and liberty of a major girl who, out of her own volition, wants to reside separately from her father."

CR No. 41/2018
S.K. Puri v. Pradeep Kumar Puri
Decided on: November 09, 2021

Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh in a petition challenging the order by the executing court whereby warrant of attachment of the property in question had been issued, reiterated the ambit and scope of Order 21 Rule 58 CPC. While observing that O21 r58 is a solitary provision relating to any claim that may be preferred or any objection that may be raised to the attachment of any property in execution of a decree, it was held ” 6. A bare perusal of above provision suggests that whenever a claim is preferred under O21 r58 against attachment of an immovable property, the court is vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate on the said claim or objection and upon determination of such claim, the court has to,in accordance with such determination, either allow the claim or objection and release the property for attachment, or disallow the claim or objection, or continue the attachment subject to mortgage, charge or other interest in favour of any person or pass such order as in the circumstances of the case it deems fit.” Commenting upon the scope of investigation under O21 r58, the Hon’ble Court emphasized that it is to find out whether the property attached in execution is or is not liable to attachment and the objector has to establish that the property belonged to him in his own right and he was in possession of it.

MA No. 17/2021
Samitra Devi v. Shree Kumar Kotwal and others
Decided on: November 03, 2021

Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, while deciding an appeal, wherein the appellant sought setting aside of the order passed by the court of learned Principal District Judge, Bhaderwah whereby the application for grant of stay was dismissed, reiterated the provision envisaged under Order XXXIX CPC and observed that grant of temporary injunction is not to put an end to the litigation, but it is a beginning of the litigation. It was observed ” 11. Rule 1 of Order XXXIX, thus, says and envisages that in the event in a suit it is by affidavit or otherwise proved that any property, which is in dispute in a suit, is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated 5 MA No. 17/2021 by any party to the suit or wrongfully sold in an execution of a decree or that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose-off his property with a view to defrauding his creditors or that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property, which is in dispute in the suit, the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property or dispossession of the plaintiff or otherwise causing injury until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. It is necessary to be seen that if the property in dispute is tried to be wasted, damaged, alienated, sold, disposed-off or there are chances of dispossessing the plaintiff from any property, which is in dispute in the suit and/or which may cause injury to the plaintiff concerning any property, which is in dispute in the suit, the Court may grant the temporary injunction. So, grant of temporary injunction is not to put an end to the litigation, but it is a beginning of the litigation and grant of the temporary injunction is aiming at preserving the property, which is in dispute in the suit because if the temporary injunction is refused to be granted, it would pave way for either of the parties before the Court to alienate, sell, dispose of and/or change the nature of the property, which is in dispute in the suit and in such situation the purpose of litigation would be futile and/or endless for both the parties. Thus, as can be professed from the Rule 1 of Order XXXIX, grant of 6 MA No. 17/2021 temporary injunction is to prevent damage or wastage to any property which is in dispute in the suit.” With this observation, the Hon’ble Court found no scope to interfere in the impugned order passed by the Trial court and accordingly dismissed the appeal.

CRM(M) 134/2019
Tanveer Hussain Khan v. State of J&K & Anr.
Decided on: October 21, 2021

Hon’ble High Court of J&K and Ladakh in a petition u/s 561-A of the J&K CrPC for quashing Challan pending disposal before the Court of Judicial Magistrate Ganderbal (Trial Magistrate), in pursuance of F.I.R. in Police Station Ganderbal, for offences u/s 323 & 498-A RPC, while exercising inherent powers and quashing the challan arising therefrom observed that allowing the trial to proceed against the husband, initiated at the instance of wife, when both are now living together peacefully, would be sheer abuse of the process of law and would do no good to anybody. It was observed” 06/ In the case of Gian Singh versus State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303, a constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that Compounding Powers should be exercised by the Court considering the social impact of the crime in question vis-à-vis its individual impact, as a decisive criteria to exercise quashing power by the High Court. It is thus trite that even if the offences are not compoundable u/s 320 Cr.PC, yet this Court, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction and with a view to render complete justice, may quash the criminal proceedings, particularly, in the matters which are private in nature and do not impact the society at large. In the instant case, due to the estrangement between husband and wife, the wife lodged a criminal complaint. The two later realized that for the welfare of their children, it would be advisable for both of them to stay together and give their relationship a second chance. With a view to iron out all the creases that had crept in their relationship, it was decided to bury the hatchet and withdraw from all litigations, civil as well as criminal”

CrLM No. 1242/2021
Ranjit Singh v. Union Territory of J&K
Decided on: October 20, 2021

Hon’ble Single Bench of High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh dismissed the bail application of an accused charged with abetment of suicide and sexual assault on a minor girl. Hon’ble Court refused to consider the general contention made by the accused-petitioner that there is no direct evidence connecting him with the commission of the alleged offence. The petitioner had filed the petition seeking bail in FIR registered at Police Station, Arnia, for commission of offences punishable under Sections 305/376 IPC read with Section 3/4 of the POCSO Act. It was the prosecution's case that a 16-year-old minor girl had died in otherwise than under normal circumstances, which allegedly had attributed reasons thereof to the petitioner accused while divulging the same to her mother-Satya Devi, during the last hours of her life on the way to the hospital as also allegedly having written the same in her diary. Based on the statement of the mother, a case was registered under Sections 376/306 IPC. Later on, during the investigation, the accused was found to have committed an offence under Sections 305/376 IPC read with 3/4 of the POSCO Act. The Hon’ble bench refused to consider the general contention made by the accused-petitioner that there is no direct evidence connecting him with the commission of the alleged offence and referred to Neeru Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2014) and Anil Kumar Yadav Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018. It was observed “13. The general contentions and grounds urged by the accused/petitioner herein that he did not commit the alleged offence and that there is no direct evidence connecting him with the commission of alleged offence or that the case of prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence cannot alone be taken into account at this stage, either LatestLaws.com 10 discarding or else overlooking the evidence collected by the prosecution during the investigation being part of the charge sheet against the accused/petitioner herein and same in view of the principles laid down by the Apex court in the judgements supra particularly regarding nature of accusation, severity of punishment in case of conviction and nature of supporting evidence as also reasonable apprehension of tampering with witness or apprehension of threat to complainant, have to be considered before grant of bail” The Hon’ble Court on the plea for applicability of Section 29 of the POCSO Act as urged by the respondents, noted that it has paled into insignificance and need not be addressed. Accordingly, the bail application was dismissed.

CRMC No.58/2019
Aditya Raj Kaul & Ors. v. Naeem Akhter
Decided on: October 13, 2021

In a petition challenging the complaint filed by the respondent before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, alleging commission of offences under Section 499 and 500 RPC, as also the order whereby cognizance of the offences has been taken and process has been issued against the petitioners as well as order passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, whereby bailable warrants for securing attendance of the petitioners have been issued, Hon’ble Single Bench of High Court of J&K and Ladakh observed that in a case where allegations made in the complaint and evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused, the High Court can exercise its powers under Section 482 of Cr. P. C to quash the proceedings against an accused. The inherent powers cannot be, however, exercised to stifle or impinge upon the proceedings. Hon’ble Court reiterated the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in its various judgments to put across that issuing a process in a criminal complaint against an accused is a serious business and it cannot be done in a casual and mechanical manner, particularly in cases relating to defamation. 47) As already noted, in the case of complaints alleging commission of offence of defamation, the responsibility of a Magistrate to examine the material on record is of a higher degree. Accordingly, the petition was allowed and the complaint pending before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, and the proceedings emanating therefrom were quashed.

CM(M) No.142/2021
Bilal Ahmad Ganai & ors. v. Sweety Rashid & ors.
Decided on: October 11, 2021

In a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before Hon’ble High Court of J&K and Ladakh challenging the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge whereby the Ld. Court has decided the Criminal Appeal filed under Section 29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and set aside the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class (Sub-Judge), Chadoora, whereby the trial Magistrate had dismissed the complaint on the ground that it did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, Hon’ble Single Bench has observed that there is no bar in entertaining a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution in matters under Domestic Violence Act,2005 even in orders passed by criminal courts. The condition laid down is that there must be manifest miscarriage of justice occasioned, and that power is not to be exercised to correct a mistake of fact and of law. In the matter, the petitioners had challenged the orders dated 29.04.2021 and 07.09.2021 - the first having been passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Budgam, in the appeal and the other one in an application made about 04 months and 22 days thereafter .The Hon’ble Bench relied on Radhey Shyam v Chhabi Nath , wherein the hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that under Article 227 of the Constitution, orders of both civil and criminal courts can be examined only in very exceptional cases when manifest miscarriage of justice has been occasioned and that such power is not to be exercised to correct a mistake of fact and of law. While referring to caselaw Hari Singh Mann v Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, (2001) 1 SCC 169, It was also observed that Once the learned Additional Sessions Judge finally decided the appeal and directed the trial Magistrate to hear and decide the complaint on the issue of territorial jurisdiction after inviting oral and documentary evidence from the parties of the complaint and after hearing both sides afresh and thereafter pass appropriate orders as the situation would demand, the appellate court became functus officio. It was held that the petition is not for correction of a mistake of fact or of law; it is a petition for undoing the miscarriage of justice caused by the impugned order in as much as the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Budgam, has entertained the miscellaneous application long after disposal of the main appeal, when there was no lis concerning the matter pending before it and under the garb of the doctrine of merger, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has converted itself into an executing court for the orders passed by the trial Magistrate which course is neither permissible under law, nor referable to any provision of the Code or the DV Act. Accordingly, while partly allowing the petition, directions were issued to the parties for appearance and the trial Court for the conduct of proceedings within stipulated period.

CRMC no.56/2019
Branch Head, J&K Bank Ltd. and another v. Arjmand Shafi
Decided on: October 08, 2021

In a petition preferred under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking quashment of complaint pending before the court of Forest Magistrate, Srinagar, the Hon’ble Single Bench of the High Court of J&K and Ladakh observed that the order of the Magistrate summoning accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. It was observed thus” 9. As can be seen in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate (1998) 5 SCC 749, summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter as criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in a complaint to have criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. The Magistrate has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused. The Hon’ble Court reiterated that the Supreme Court has cautioned that Magistrate should carefully scrutinize as to whether allegations made in the complaint meet basic ingredients of the offence alleged and whether the accused is really required to be summoned. With these observations, this petition was allowed and complaint was dismissed and order issuing the process as also summons against petitioners was set aside.

CM(M) No.127/2021
Mohammad Yaqoob Lone and others v. Hamidullah Lone and others
Decided on: October 05, 2021

In a writ petition filed before Hon’ble High Court of J&K and Ladakh wherein the petitioners sought setting-aside of the Order dated 23.08.2021, passed by the court of Principal District Judge, Kulgam in a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal by which the Order dated 17.06.2021, passed by the court of Sub Judge, Kulgam, dismissing the interim application of the respondents, has been set-aside, the Hon’ble Single Bench observed that grant of temporary injunction is not to put an end to the litigation, but it is a beginning of the litigation and grant of the temporary injunction is aiming at preserving the property, which is in dispute in the suit because if the temporary injunction is refused to be granted, it would pave way for either of the parties before the Court to alienate, sell, dispose of and/or change the nature of the property, which is in dispute in the suit and in such situation the purpose of litigation would be futile and/or endless for both the parties. Hon’ble Court referred to case law Wander Ltd vs. Antox India P. Ltd, 1990 Supp (1) SCC 727; Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. and ors, AIR 1999 SC 2372 and Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.) Faridkot vs. Baldev Dass (2004) 8 SCC 488 . It was observed “19. Grant of an order of injunction is intended to preserve and maintain in status quo the rights of the parties and to protect the plaintiff, being the initiator, of the action against the incursion of his rights and for which there is no appropriate compensation being quantified in terms of damages.” while holding that the Appellate Court, in the present case, has been right to set-aside the Trial Court order and grant interim injunction in favour of plaintiff/respondent. the writ petition was dismissed.

CONSW No. 55/2012
Shahzad Khalid v. State of J&K and ors.
Decided on: October 04, 2021

In a review petition filed before the Hon’ble High Court of J&K and Ladakh, the Hon’ble Bench reiterated the scope of powers exercisable by a court in its review jurisdiction. Hon’ble referred to case law, Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 1372; Parsion Devi and Others v. Sumitri Devi and Others, (1997) 8 SCC 715, Board of Control for Cricket, India and another v. Netaji Cricket Club and others, AIR 2005 SC 592 and other precedents on the point that under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, the review will be maintainable upon i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; iii) Any other sufficient reason . In the case at hand, the petitioner was seeking review of the judgment and order dated 09.10.2012. on the ground that in the writ petition, the petitioner was not made a party respondent and further that the writ petitioners had not specifically questioned the order of appointment of the petitioner. The Hon'ble Court further observed that the judgment and order dated 09.10.2012, in regard to which, the review petition has been filed, it can be seen that the directions are general in character and in case, the impugned judgment and order was prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner, in any manner, then the right remedy for the petitioner to avail was to file an LPA after seeking leave in that regard, which has not been done. It was observed that “The review jurisdiction is extremely limited and unless there is mistake apparent on the face of the record, the order/judgment does not call for review. The mistake apparent on record means that the mistake is self-evident, needs no search and stares at its face. Surely, review jurisdiction is not an appeal in disguise”. Hon’ble Court observed that the judgment and order impugned, on the face of it, does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record and therefore was found to be without any merit and accordingly dismissed.

WP(Crl) No. 54/2020
Balbir Chand v. UT of J&K and others
Decided on: August 21, 2021

Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh while deciding a petition preferred against the order of District Magistrate, Kathua whereby the petitioner was placed under preventive detention with a view to prevent him from indulging in the criminal activities which are detrimental to the society; observed that non-communication of information to the detenue that independent of his right to file representation against his detention to the government, has also right to submit a representation to detaining authority till detention was considered by the government and accorded approval thereto, is in essence, violation of constitutional & statutory rights of detenue, guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 13 of the Act of 1978 and infraction of provisions of section 13 of the Act of 1978 read with Article 22(5) of the constitution of India. It was observed that:”In reliance to State of Maharashtra and others v. Santosh Shankar Acharya (2000) 7 SCC 463, in the present case detaining authority did not informed detenue that detenue, independent of his right to file representation against his detention to the Government, has also right to submit a representation to detaining authority till detention was considered by the Government and accorded approval thereto. Detaining authority has, in essence, violated constitutional & statutory rights of detenue, guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 13 of the Act of 1978 and resultantly vitiates impugned detention .” Placing reliance on case laws Noor-ud-Din Shah v. State of J&K & Ors. 1989 SLJ 1, Naba Lone v. District Magistrate 1988 SLJ 300 & Jai Singh and Ors. V. State of Jammu & Kashmir AIR 1985 SC 764, the Hon’ble Court observed that passing of an order of detention in a routine manner oblivious to the import of preventive detention goes to the root of its validity. Accordingly, the order impugned was observed to be verbatim copy of Police Dossier and was accordingly quashed.

LPA No. 58/2021
Doulat Ram and Another v. Roop Chand and Others
Pronounced on: August 24, 2021

Hon’ble High Court of J&K and Ladakh ,in an appeal filed under clause 12 of the Letters Patent directed against order passed by a learned Single Judge, whereby the petition of the appellants for re-admission (RESC No.23/2018) of Civil First Appeal (CFA No. 22/2013) was dismissed vide order and judgment dated 17.09.2018, has been rejected, while deciding the appeal identified the following questions of seminal importance for consideration:- i) Whether the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 17.09.2018 ,passed in the absence of appellants or their counsel on 20.07.2018 when the matter was heard and reserved, is an order or judgment passed under Order-41 Rule 17(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, application under Order 41 Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure for its re-admission lies and is maintainable? ii) If answer to the question No. (i) is in the affirmative; whether order of rejection of the application filed by the appellants under Order 41 Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking readmission of the appeal is appealable under clause 12 of the Letters Patent and whether the bar created by Section 100-A CPC that no further appeal shall lie from an order of the learned Single Judge hearing and deciding an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order, would be attracted? Reference was made to Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure which deals with appeals from original decrees and procedure for hearing which is laid down in Rules 16 to 29. It was observed that it is the appellant that is given the right to be heard first in support of the appeal on the date fixed or any other date to which the hearing may be adjourned by the appellate court. If, upon hearing the appellant, the court does not dismiss the appeal at once, it would hear the respondent against the appeal and in such case the appellant shall be entitled to reply. It was also observed that Rules 16,17 and 19, when read altogether, would unequivocally provide that if on the date fixed or any other date to which the hearing may be adjourned, the appellant does not appear, the only option with the appellate court is to dismiss the appeal for default and not on merits. Hon’ble Court placed reliance on Division Bench of the Court in the case of Ghulam Qadir and others v. Sikander and others, 1981 AIR (J&K) 30 and held that order and judgment dated 17.09.2018 in CFA which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on merits yet it shall be deemed to be the one passed by the learned Single Judge under Rule 17(1) of Order 41 CPC. That being the position, application under Order 41 Rule 19 CPC was clearly maintainable against order dated 17.09.2018 and the order passed by the appellate court rejecting the application under Order 41 Rule 19 is appealable order in terms of Order 43 Rule 1(t). Hon’ble Court discussed Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 100-A of the Code containing non-obstante clause i.e. "notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent of the High Court or in any instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force in the State", which means that Section 100- A is a specific provision to the contrary in terms of Section 4 and, therefore, has overriding effect on Clause 12 of the Letters Patent of this Court where it is an appeal heard and decided by a Single Judge of the High Court from original or appellate decree or order. It was accordingly observed: “22) When we examine the instant case in light of the provisions of Section 100-A CPC, we do not find that the order impugned before us is the one passed by the Single Bench of this Court hearing and deciding any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order. The impugned order is an order passed by the Single Bench under Order-41 Rule 19, whereby the petition filed by the appellants for re-admission of the appeal dismissed vide judgment dated 17.09.2018, has been rejected. This order cannot be said to have decided an appeal either from original or appellate decree or order.” Hon’ble Court accordingly held the appeal to be maintainable and while allowing the same and remanded the case back to the learned Single Judge for hearing and deciding the Civil First Appeal afresh.

CIMA No. 100/2013
Chief Engineer & Ors v. M/S K. K. Chibber
Pronounced on: August 21, 2021

In an appeal filed under section 37 of The Jammu and Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997, the appellants had challenged the dismissal of the application filed under section 34 of the Act challenging the award of the sole Arbitrator and had assailed the judgment of Ld. District Judge, Kishtwar, stating that it was against Section 2(e) of the 1997 Act because the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the District Judge. In opposition of the argument, the respondent had supported the judgment by saying that parties have agreed to the seat of Arbitration being in Delhi and the law applicable being the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996, therefore, award could not be challenged in the court of District Judge Kishtwar even if the work was executed within the jurisdiction of District Kishtwar. Hon’ble High Court of J&K and Ladakh relied on 'State of Maharashtra V/s Atlanta Ltd. 2014(II) SCC 619', with reference to Section 42 of the Act and Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited V. Datawind Innovations Private Limited and others,' (2017) 7 SCC 678 observed that District Judge, Kishtwar was right in dismissing the application filed under Section 34 of the J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997, but he should have refrained from expressing any opinion on which Court will have jurisdiction. Observing that , it is only Section 42 of the Act which determines the jurisdiction of the court notwithstanding anything contrary to the Act, the Hon’ble Court relied on para 29 of the Atlanta case, reproduced under, and dismissed the appeal as not maintainable “29. The first issue which needs to be examined is, whether a challenge to an arbitration award (or arbitral agreement, or arbitral proceeding), wherein jurisdiction lies with more than one court, can be permitted to proceed simultaneously in two different courts. For the above determination, it is necessary to make a reference to Section 42 of the Arbitration Act. The aforesaid provision accordingly is being extracted hereunder: "42. Jurisdiction.-Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this part or in any other law for the time being in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this Part has been made in a court, that court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that court and in no other court." A perusal of Section 42 of the Arbitration Act reveals a clear acknowledgment by the legislature, that the jurisdiction for raising a challenge to the same arbitration agreement, arbitral proceeding or arbitral award, could most definitely arise in more than one court simultaneously. To remedy such a situation Section 42 of the Arbitration Act mandates, that the court wherein the first application arising out of such a challenge is filed, shall also have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute(s), which are filed later in point of time. The above legislative intent must also be understood as mandating, that disputes arising out of the same arbitration agreement, arbitral proceeding or arbitral award, would not be adjudicated upon by more than one court, even though jurisdiction to raise such disputes may legitimately lie before two or more courts."

AA No. 5/2020
Supinder Kour v. Mdn Edify Education Pvt. Ltd.
Decided on: August 20, 2021

In an appeal preferred by the petitioner under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Jammu, whereby the court without touching the merits of the case dismissed the petition of appellant herein filed under Section 9 of the Act on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter, the Hon’ble High Court of J&K and Ladakh held that the moment the seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause and where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the court at a particular place, only such court will have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and parties intended to exclude all other courts. Hon’ble Court made reference to paragraphs 4, 5, 15, 16, 17 & 18 of the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 5850/2019 decided on 25.07.2019 and observed that It is well settled that where more than one court has jurisdiction, it is open for the parties to exclude all other courts. “16. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the court at a particular place, only such court will have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and parties intended to exclude all other courts. In the present case, the parties have agreed that the "venue" of arbitration shall be at Bhubaneswar. Considering the agreement of the parties having Bhubaneswar as the venue of arbitration, the intention of the parties is to exclude all other courts. As held in Swastik, non-use of words like "exclusive jurisdiction", "only", "exclusive", "alone" is not decisive and does not make any material difference.” Accordingly, while observing that the Order impugned required no interference, the appeal was dismissed.

OW 104 No. 02/2015
Puran Chand v. Tarsem Lal
Decided on: August 10, 2021

Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh while dismissing a petition invoking supervisory jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Court seeking setting aside of the order dated 15.11.2014 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Samba in a misc. appeal before the appellate court against the order of dismissal of application for interim relief accompanying the suit, by the Court of learned Sub Judge, Samba reiterated the legal position under Order 7 Rule 14 CPC envisaging that where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon a document in his possession or power in support of his claim, the plaintiff has to enter such documents in a list, and produce it in court when the plaint is presented by him and also at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint. During the pendency of the said appeal the applicant/petitioner moved an application for placing on record a compromise deed dated 23.07.2011 claiming therein that the parties have executed a compromise deed amongst themselves in respect of the land in question which the respondents objected as being forged. It was observed that “Although sub-rule 3 of Rule 14 of Order 7, postulate that a document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.” Hon’ble Court relied on law laid down by the Apex Court in cases titled Shalini Shyam Sheety and another vs. Rajinder Shankar Patgil, reported in 2010 (8) SCC 3291 and Radhey Shyam and another vs. Chhabi Nath and others, reported in 2015 (5) SCC 423. and observed that “6. As has been noticed in the preceding paras upon perusal of the record, the appellate court is seized of a misc. appeal testing the legality or otherwise of the order dated 12.07.2014 passed in the application for interim relief accompanying the suit. Filing of the application before the appellate court while it is considering a misc. appeal, therefore, has rightly not been entertained by the said court. Nothing prevented the petitioner to seek the leave of the court for production of compromise deed before the trial court which is seized of the main suit, notwithstanding the objections raised by the respondent in his objections in opposition to the said application.”

CRM(M) No.653/2019
Arshad Ahmad Allaie v. UT of J&K & Anr.
Pronounced on: 06 July, 2021

Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir while deciding a petition whereby the petitioner had challenged an order granting extension of period of custody of accused beyond 180 days passed by a Sessions Court in terms of Section 36-A of NDPS Act and was claiming entitlement for default bail, ruled that where an accused is facing investigation for offences under UAPA together with offences under NDPS Act, concerned Sessions Judge under Section 36 of NDPS Act is vested with jurisdiction to extend the custody of such an accused beyond the period of 180 days subject to fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 36A of NDPS Act. It was observed that jurisdiction to extend detention of an accused beyond the period of 90 days in relation to a case where the accused is booked for offences under UA(P) Act, which is included in the Schedule appended to NIA Act, vests with Special Court constituted in terms of provisions of NIA Act and Proviso to subsection (4) of Section 36-A gives jurisdiction to Special Court to extend the custody of a person who is accused of offences under NDPS Act beyond 180 days up to one year on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for detention of the accused beyond said period of 180 days. Further observing that Section 36-D of the NDPS Act provides for a situation where Special Courts in terms of Section 36 of the NDPS Act have not been constituted, The Hon’ble Court pointed out there is high pendency of cases related to offences under NDPS Act in JK and in the absence of Special Courts, these cases are being tried by ordinary Sessions Courts thereby resulting in delay in disposal of these cases and the very object of the Act is getting defeated. The court expressed its anguish and dismay for the manner in which "the successive governments of erstwhile state of JK and now union territory of JK have dragged their feet on constitution and setting up of Special Courts in terms of Section 36 of NDPS Act in this part of the Country " and asked the government to take immediate steps for setting up of Special Courts for speedy disposal of cases related to offences under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, (NDPS) 1985.

Bail App No.253/2020
Sohan Singh v. Union Territory of J&K
Decided on: 24 June, 2021

Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir while dismissing a Bail application observed that case where gravity of offence alleged against an accused is severe, the bail cannot be granted only on the ground of long incarceration. The Petitioner in this case was incarcerated since 31st December, 2012 for allegedly committing an offence under Section 302 of RPC. He was charged by the Trail Court in February 2014 and subsequent developments pertaining to impleadment of more persons as accused led to stay of Trial by the Supreme Court in December 2016. According to the petitioner, there has been unexplained and unreasonable delay in completion of the trial of the case, which entitles him to the grant of bail. The High Court opined that nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction has to be kept in mind before granting bail. Referring to case law case of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav and another, (2004) 7 SCC 528, the Bench observed that the conditions laid down in Section 437(1)(i) of Cr. P. C are sine qua non for granting bail even under Section 439 of the Code, meaning thereby that in a case where a person is alleged to be involved in a offence punishable with death sentence or imprisonment for life, he cannot be released on bail if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of such an offence. It was also observed that as per case law State of UP through CBI v. Amaramani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21, a detailed examination of the evidence is to be avoided while considering the question of bail, to ensure that there is no pre-judging and no prejudice. The Bench further held that: “It is true that some delay in completion of trial has taken place on account of restrictions in physical hearing of cases due to COVID-19 pandemic but that is an eventuality beyond the control of everybody. The same cannot be the sole ground for enlarging an accused on bail, particularly in a heinous offence like murder. Even otherwise, the Supreme Court in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar’s case (supra) has clearly laid down that in a case where gravity of offence alleged against an accused is severe, the bail cannot be granted only on the ground of long incarceration.” With these observations, the petition was dismissed.

CrLA(D) No. 08/2020
Vishal Sharma v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir through SHO P/S Domana and Anr.
Pronounced on: 02 June, 2021

A Division Bench of Hon’ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir refused to suspend the sentence for the three convicts in the 2008 Deputy Advocate General Murder case and said it cannot overlook the fact that the accused-applicants have been held guilty and convicted for commission of a "heinous offence against the then serving Law Officer". The Hon’ble Bench referred to the judgement of the Apex court passed in case titled as “Preet Pal Singh Vs. State of UP” reported in 2020 (4) SCC 201 and reiterated that power of suspension of sentence by Appellate Court under Section 389 Cr.P.C confers 'discretionary jurisdiction' and has to be "exercised sparingly". “A plain reading of Section 389 Cr.P.C, makes it is clear that the Section confers discretionary jurisdiction on Appellate court to suspend the execution of sentence during the pendency of the appeal on valid reasons recorded in writing. Law being settled that although the High court is not debarred from suspending the sentence and granting bail to a convict but that power has to be exercised sparingly while objectively assessing the matter and that too in the particular circumstances of each case.” It further noted that they were convicted after a full trial for about twelve 6 years by the Trial Court upon evaluation of ocular, circumstantial, medical and scientific evidence and were sentenced to life by a Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu in July 2020. The applicant-accused had also applied for bail on the premise that they have been under incarceration for the last more than 10 years and there is no possibility of adjudication/disposal of their respective appeals by the Court in near future. The Bench held that a conjoint reading of the applications in hand would reveal that in none of the said applications the applicants have spelt out any cogent ground giving rise to substantial doubt about the validity of the conviction, or that there is likelihood of unreasonable delay in disposal of their appeals. The applicants in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case were not held entitled to suspension of sentence and consequent grant of concession of bail during pendency of their respective appeals and as such, applications were dismissed.

CM(M)No.1/2021
Amar Nath and Another v. Darshana Kumari & ors.
Decided on: 04 June, 2021

In a petition invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir Court vested in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner sought quashment of the proceedings initiated by the Trial Court on a suit filed by respondents aggrieved of the fact that the same is third suit in succession filed by the respondent No.1 to 3 on same cause of action and that he has raised the plea of non-maintainability of the suit and sought rejection of the plaint in terms of Order VII Rule 11 CPC but the same is not being decided by the trial court. The Hon’ble Bench held that once a plea of non-maintainability of suit is taken by the party and particularly when a specific application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is moved seeking rejection of the plaint, it is a bounden duty of the civil court trying the suit to first advert to and decide the said application. The Court disposed of the petition directing the trial court to consider and decide the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at the earliest and in any case not later than two months from the date copy of the order is received by the trial court.

CRM (M) 214/2019
Altaf Hussain Mufti v. Javed Choudhary
Decided on: May 20, 2021

“What emerges from the aforesaid analysis it is deducible that both the elements i.e. mens rea and act us rea, sine qua non for constituting an offence of defamation are found missing in the article in question in its entirety. There has been neither any intent on the part of the petitioner to cause harm to the reputation of the complainant respondent herein nor is it discernible that any actual harm has been done to the reputation of complainant respondent herein, more particularly in view of the fact that the complainant respondent herein has been found eligible for promotion as Principal GMC Srinagar by the government. The case of the petitioner indisputably can be said to fall within the above exceptions appended to section 499 IPC.” “As per the mandate of section 267 and 268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now sections 227 and 228 of the Cr.P.C.), while considering the issue of framing of charge/discharge of the accused, the learned trial court has to form an opinion on the basis of material placed on record by the Investigating Officer as to whether there is sufficient ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence or not and the material on record would constitute the statement of witnesses, injury report/post-mortem report along with other material relied upon by the prosecution. At this stage, learned trial court cannot indulge in critical evolution of the evidence, that can be done at the time of final appreciation of evidence after the conclusion of the trial.

CRR No. 27/2010
State of J&K and Anr v. Tanveer Ahmad Salah and Ors
Decided on: May 19, 2021

A Single Bench of the Hon’ble High Court of J&K while deciding a revision petition preferred against the order passed by the Court of Learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Baramulla by virtue of which the respondents have been discharged for commission of offences under sections 302, 307 RPC and section 3 of the Public Properties (Prevention of Damages) Act and have been ordered to be charged for commission of offences under sections 304-A, 323, 336, 341, 427, 148 and 149 RPC ,observed that at the stage of considering the issue of framing of charge/discharge of the accused, the trial court should not conduct a mini trial and rather should form an opinion on the basis of material placed on record by the Investigating Officer as to whether there is sufficient ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence or not.

CRM(M) No. 146/2021
Zulfikar Hussain Dar v. Aijaz Ahmad Dar
Decided on: May 17, 2021

The Bench while reiterating the ingredients of Section 138 of the N.I. Act observed that neither at the time of taking cognizance of the complaint nor at the time of issuance of process the accused in required to be heard in the matter. The accused comes into picture only after the process for his appearance in the criminal complaint is issued and he appears before the Magistrate. Further, while holding that the stage of taking cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint precedes the examination of complainant and his witness under Section 200 Cr.P.C, the Court also delved into the true meaning of the word ‘cognizance’ and at what stage of proceedings the Magistrate is obliged to take it before proceeding further in the matter. It was observed, “cognizance’ in general meaning is said to be ‘knowledge’ or ‘notice’ and taking cognizance of offences means, ‘taking notice’ or ‘become aware of the alleged commission of offence’. The dictionary meaning of the word, ‘cognizance’ is ‘judicial hearing of a matter’. The term ‘cognizance of offence’ is nowhere defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sections 190 to 199 of the Cr.P.C deal with method and the limitations, subject to which various Criminal Court sought to take cognizance of offences.

Bail App. No. 139 of 2020
Badri Nath v. Union Territory of J&K
Decided on: December 11, 2020

The presumption of guilt engrafted in sec 29 of POCSO Act gets triggered and applies only once trial begins, that is after charges are framed against the accused and not before that. But at the time of considering bail application of accused under sec 3, 5, 7 & 9 of POCSO Act, the presumption under sec 29 of the said Act would come into play at the pre-trial stage. It is necessary for all the Special Courts constituted under the POCSO Act within the Union Territories of J&K and Ladakh, to ensure that the victim/Child Welfare Committee is informed about the proceedings in bail petitions of the persons accused of having committed offences under the aforesaid Act by issuing prior notice to them. Rejection of bail application by an inferior court does not operate as a bar for the superior court in entertaining similar application on same facts and same offence.

SLA No. 38 of 2018
State of J&K v. Mohd. Imran Khan
Decided on: December 24, 2020

The High court directed all Courts of UT of J&K and Ladakh to avoid disclosing identity of rape survivors in their proceedings and judgments. The Court further issued directions to health professionals of UTs of J&K and Ladakh to desist from undertaking 'two finger test' known as 'per vaginal examination' on rape survivors. Proper measures should be taken to ensure the safety of rape survivors and no arbitrary or unlawful interference should be there with their privacy.

CRM(M) 259 of 2019
Satpal Sharma v. Pawan Singh Rathore, Ex Vice Chairman, JDA
Decided on: December 17, 2020

The order u/sec. 156(3) CrPC is an interlocutory order and no revision against the same lies. In an application under section 156(3) the suspect named in the application under section 156(3) does not have a right to be heard at the time of registration of a F.I.R.

Crl LP(D) 02/2020
Union of India, National Control Bureau v. Rafi Ahmad
Decided on: December 15, 2020

The statement recorded under Section 67 of NDPS Act without corroboration is sufficient to convict an accused, but for that, the court has to be satisfied about its voluntary nature. Confessional statement recorded under Section 67 of NDPS Act cannot be used as being barred under the provision of Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

CRMC No. 105 of 2018
Syed Zubair Shah & Ors. v. Farhat Rashid Sheikh
Decided on: December 04, 2020

Once the cause of action for a particular relief is continuing, the application under Domestic Violence Act cannot be dismissed being time barred. Petition cannot be dismissed at the threshold on the issue of maintainability when there are disputed questions of facts, which require adjudication.

Public Notice

FAO(WC) 04/2020
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN FAO(WC) 04/2020

MA 289/2017
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN MA 289/2017

MA 220/2018
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MA 220/2018
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CR.43/2019 c/w CCP(S).300/2020 WP(C}.1672/2020
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CONC. 139/2016
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN CONC. 139/2016

Mac App 142/2019
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN Mac App 142/2019

CONC No. 03/2018 c/w APCIV No.06/2018 CONC No.08/2018
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN CONC No. 03/2018 c/w APCIV No.06/2018 CONC No.08/2018

MA.20/2021
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN MA.20/2021

MA 5/2023
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN CM No.5410/2023 in WP(C)No.669/2022

MA 5/2023
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN MA.5/2023

MA 338/2013
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN MA 338/2013

MA 15/2019
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MA 84/2010 C/W MA 82/2010 & MA 83/2010
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN MA 84/2010 C/W MA 82/2010 & MA 83/2010

RFA.24/2019
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN RFA.24/2019

MA 338/2013
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN MA 338/2013

TrP(C) No. 1/2023
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN TrP(C) No. 1/2023

SWP No.782/2019 WP(C) No.1206/2019
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN SWP No.782/2019 WP (C) No.1206/2019

OWP No 745/2004
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN OWP No 745/2004

TrP(C) No. 01/2023
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN TrP(C) No. 01/2023

05th of August 2023
Notification regarding list of cases which are 20 years old and above. (Srinagar-Wing)

05th of August 2023
Notification regarding list of cases which are 20 years old and above. (Jammu-Wing)

Mac App.78/2021
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN Mac App.78/2021

MA 284/2011
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN MA 284/2011

OWP 1894/2015
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN OWP 1894/2015

RFA 24/2019
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS IN RFA 24/2019

OWP No.1363_2016
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS 1 to 11

WP( C) No.2411_2022
NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS 1 to 114 FOR APPEARANCE

WP(C) No.940_2023
Notice under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC in WP(C) No.940_2023

WP(C) No.1044_2023
Notice under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC in WP(C) No.1044_2023

Mac App.164/2019
Notice in Mac App.164/2019

MA 52/2016
Notice in MA 52/2016

CRM(M) No. 738/2022
Notice in CRM(M) No. 738/2022

Wp(c) 1035_2023
Notice in WP(C) No.1035_2023

MA.220/2018
Notice in MA.220/2018

Mac App. 28/2021
Notice in Mac App. 28/2021

WP(c) No 926/2023
Notice under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC in WP(c) No 926/2023

WP(c) No 816/2023
Notice under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC in WP(c) No 816/2023

WP(c) No 2552/2022
Notice under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC in WP(c) No 2552/2022

WP(c) No 806/2023
Notice to respondents 9 to 521 for appearance in WP(c) No 806/2023

News & Notifications

07th of December 2023
Advertisement for the posts of Readers (Direct quota) (Gazetted) in the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh.

26th of November 2023
Answer Key of Question Booklet (Series-A,B & C) of Written examination for the post of Junior Assistants in the District Judiciary of UT of Ladakh pursuant to the Advertisement Notification No. 642 of 2023/Psy dated 10.04.2023.

26th of November 2023
Question Booklet (Series-C) of Written examination for the post of Junior Assistants in the District Judiciary of UT of Ladakh pursuant to the Advertisement Notification No. 642 of 2023/Psy dated 10.04.2023.

26th of November 2023
Question Booklet (Series-B) of Written examination for the post of Junior Assistants in the District Judiciary of UT of Ladakh pursuant to the Advertisement Notification No. 642 of 2023/Psy dated 10.04.2023.

26th of November 2023
Question Booklet (Series-A) of Written examination for the post of Junior Assistants in the District Judiciary of UT of Ladakh pursuant to the Advertisement Notification No. 642 of 2023/Psy dated 10.04.2023.

23th of November 2023
Notification regarding advertisement Notice No. 03 of 2022/RG/NG dated 30.08.2022..

08th of November 2023
Notification regarding all those candidates who have applied for the post of Junior Assistant in the District Judiciary of UT of Ladakh pursuant to the Advertise Notification No. 642 of 2023/Psy dated 10.04.2023.

08th of November 2023
Notification regarding written test of all the candidates who have applied for the post of Junior Assistant pursuant to advertisement notification no. 642 of 2023/Psy dated 10.04.2023, will be now held in offline mode, instead of online mode.

03rd of November 2023
Newsletter of the eCommittee, Supreme Court of India for the month of September, 2023

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